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I. Introduction 
 
In this paper I argue that middle powers that are members of the G20 can extract substantial 
benefit from their participation in the G20 if they have both a clear long term vision of global 
economic governance and a plan of action that is based on obtainable short term objectives.   
 
To establish this proposition, I will address four issues.  The first is that the institutional 
arrangements for global economic governance will remain unstable until the current process of 
changes in the balance of global political and economic power plays itself out. The second is 
that, given the changing international power dynamics, the current “manager” of the global 
economy, the G20, is unlikely to be a stable entity. Consequently it can only be effective if it 
focuses on the relatively narrow range of economic issues of common interest to all G20 
members. Third, middle-size countries need a long term vision of global financial governance to 
guide their conduct in the G20 and other forums of global governance. Fourth, the middle 
powers will only be able to capitalize on whatever short term opportunities may arise from their 
participation in the G20 if they identify a set of achievable short term objectives and devise a 
strategy for reaching them.  
 
II. State of Transition in Geo-Political Power 
 
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that the G7
4
  countries are no longer able to function as 
the pre-eminent forum for global economic governance. These countries have been forced to 
recognize that they need the other G20 countries to effectively manage the global economic and 
financial system. Consequently, they elevated the G20, which had previously been only a 
gathering of finance ministers and central bankers, to the level of a meeting of heads of state. 
This has two important consequences. First, it is resulting in pressure to expand the agenda of the 
G20 beyond its prior relatively narrow focus on financial and monetary affairs, which could 
undermine its effectiveness. Second, it is converting the G20 into potentially the most important 
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international forum for the management of the global economy, even though it lacks stable 
membership
5
, a permanent secretariat and a formal legal existence.  
 
The shift in power away from the G7 countries should not be over-stated. While these countries 
have accepted the G20’s pre-eminence in economic matters, they have not surrendered their 
control over the global economic agenda, which is dominated by the regulatory and governance 
issues of most interest to them.  The shifting balance of power merely means that the rising 
powers in the G20 can participate in the discussions on these agenda items and can influence 
their prioritization. They do not appear able, however, to persuade the G20 to take decisions that 
the G7 oppose.
6
 
 
The current situation, therefore, must be seen as being a time of transition, in which the leading 
states in the G7 seem to be loosing power relative to some of the larger and more influential 
developing countries in the G20. This shift in the balance of relative power has only advanced 
far enough to deprive the G7 of their previous dominance. The rising powers however have not 
gained sufficient power to have either the will or the ability to take over leadership of the global 
economic system. The result is an unstable situation in which the institutional arrangements for 
global governance are likely to remain provisional until the process of rebalancing global power 
has played itself out and the relative positions of the new and old powers are clarified.  
 
There are some inevitable consequences that follow from our current position in the rebalancing 
process. First, we can only be confident that the G20, as currently constituted, will remain the 
primary manager of global economic governance in the short-to-medium term. It is already 
possible to see pressure to change its composition, as evidenced by the facts that additional 
invitees, such as Spain and the Netherlands,  have been included on an ad hoc basis in the G20 
summits and that there is pressure to expand its agenda beyond financial and economic issues to 
include such issues as climate change and development.   
 
Second, the efforts to reform the current institutional arrangements for global economic 
governance are likely to be partial, unsatisfactory and unsustainable. This suggests that, while 
limited reforms are possible, their can be no definitive resolution of the debates about the 
mandates and the governance of the existing international financial institutions. Similarly, there 
is unlikely to be a final determination about whether the Financial Stability Board should be 
merely a forum of discussion and coordination among regulators or, for example using its 
proposed peer review mechanism, should play a more active role in global economic 
governance. Also unlikely to be resolved is the appropriate role, procedures, and power of bodies 
like the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS), the International Organizations of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS).  
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Third, the institutional relationships between the G20, global institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group, and sub-global groupings of states, whether based 
on regional or other criteria, cannot be effectively resolved until the over-arching global power 
relations are clarified. However, it is important to note that the resulting uncertainty can create 
opportunities for these sub-global groups to help shape the future global order into one that is 
more open to effective participation by all participants.  
 
III. Short Term Agenda 
 
During the current process of power rebalancing the range of issues on which meaningful and 
sustainable results are obtainable is likely to be narrow and limited to tinkering with the existing 
arrangements. This can be seen, for example, in the limited agreements reached on reforming the 
governance of the IMF and the World Bank, despite the general agreement on the need for 
change in their decision making procedures and their mandates. The changes that have been 
agreed and, in some cases actually implemented, have not substantially altered the real power 
arrangements in these institutions. For example, the recently announced change in World Bank 
voting, once implemented, will merely increase the vote for developing and transitional countries 
from about 44% of total to 47% of total and it will not affect either the  US veto or  the ability of 
the EU member states to block decisions that they strongly oppose. Similarly, the promised 
change in the procedures for selecting the leader of the World Bank and the IMF is unlikely to 
significantly change the functioning of these organizations. As the example of the United 
Nations shows, those states with vetoes are able to dominate an institution even if its head is not 
one of their nationals.  
 
The current international efforts to reform global financial regulation are similarly constrained. 
The items at the top of the global regulatory reform agenda -- capital adequacy, liquidity, hedge 
funds, derivatives, executive bonuses, bank taxes to recoup the costs of earlier bank bailouts—
are all items of most interest to G7 countries. There appears to be no space on the international 
agenda for such issues as expanding access to the financial system, an important issue for 
African countries and others in the developing world, reinvestment of capital flight back into the 
developing countries, using regulatory incentives to encourage greater attention to development 
issues or broadening participation in the decision making procedures of the BCBS, IOSCO and 
the IAIS.  
 
IV. A Long Term Vision of Global Governance 
 
As discussed above, the middle powers can only effectively exploit the limited opportunities 
arising from their participation in the G20 if they base their actions in the G20 on a long term 
vision of global economic governance. This vision should be based on the following five factors. 
 
A. A Holistic Vision of Development 
 
All states are developing states in the sense that they are striving to create better lives for their 
citizens. While states may differ in defining their responsibilities in this regard and on which 
aspects of the development process they wish to prioritize, they all agree that the well-being of 
both individuals and societies can be positively or negatively affected by a range of economic 
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and non-economic factors. Thus they all see development as a comprehensive and holistic 
process in which the economic aspects cannot be separated from the social, political, 
environmental, and cultural aspects, all of which are integrated into one dynamically integrated 
process.
 7
    
 
The extent to which the global governance arrangements incorporate this holistic vision of 
development will influence how effectively they help all states achieve their developmental 
objectives.  
 
B. Comprehensive coverage 
 
Comprehensive coverage means that the mechanisms and institutions of international economic 
governance should be applicable to all stakeholders in the international economy. For example, 
the mechanisms of international financial governance must be incorporate the activities and 
operations of financial intermediaries that engage in sophisticated national and cross border 
financial transactions and their clients, savers and investors who wish to base their financial 
transactions on religious principles, as well as small financial institutions that operate only in 
local markets, and micro-financial institutions.   
 
There are three important corollaries that follow from the principle of comprehensive coverage. 
First, the mechanisms of international economic governance must be sufficiently flexible and 
dynamic that they can adapt to the changing needs and activities of their diverse stakeholders.  
Second, the totality of international economic governance arrangements must ensure that the 
international community receives all the services it requires from a well functioning global 
economic system. The third corollary, which is intended to ensure that the governance 
arrangements are flexible, efficient and not unduly centralized, is the principle of subsidiarity.
8
 
This principle holds that all decisions should be taken at the lowest level in the system 
compatible with effective decision making. It is a complicated principle to implement because it 
must apply both in standard operating conditions and in crisis situations, which may require that 
decisions are made at a different level than is the case during standard conditions.  In addition, it 
needs to be linked to a conflict resolution mechanism that is capable of resolving disputes 
between regulators at different levels as to which level is the most appropriate for resolving a 
particular issue 
 
C. Respect for applicable international law 
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The institution arrangements for international economic governance, either because they are 
formal international organizations created by treaty or involve decision making by sovereign 
states, should comply with applicable international legal principles. In particular, this means that 
the decision-making bodies and institutions engaged in international economic governance 
should conform to universally applicable customary and treaty based international legal 
principles. There are four sets of principles that are applicable in this regard.  
 
The first is the principle of respect for national sovereignty. It is clear that by participating in a 
global governance arrangement, states are agreeing to forego some level of sovereignty in order 
to reap the benefits of a well-functioning international system. Given the different power and 
wealth characteristics of the participating states, it follows that, de facto, the amount of 
independence they give up will be positively related to their power and wealth. However, the 
principle of national sovereignty should still provide them with the means for preserving as much 
independence and policy space as is practicable and consistent with the demands of effective 
global financial governance.  
 
The second is the general principle of non- discrimination. This means that the institutions of 
international economic governance should treat all similarly situated states and individuals in the 
same way. This inevitably means that there will be disparate treatment for differently situated 
states and individuals.  The key question thus becomes what standards can be used to ensure that 
all stakeholders receive treatment that is fair and reasonable.  
 
In the case of sovereign states, this means that, while the institutions of global governance should 
base their treatment of all states on the same principles, they should apply these principles in a 
way that is responsive to the different situations of each member state. One way of implementing 
this approach could be to apply the general principle of special and differential treatment that is 
applicable in a number of international legal contexts -- for example international environmental 
and international trade law -- to international economic governance. This could result in special 
consideration being given to weak and poor states so that they are able to enjoy a meaningful 
level of participation in international economic decision making structures, even when they are 
based on principles like weighted voting.  A consequence to this may be that the organization 
offers some mechanism of accountability to these states and their citizens to compensate for any 
participation deficit.  
 
In the case of non-state stakeholders in global economic governance, the relevant principles 
should be derived from documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which many 
now consider to be part of customary international law
9
. Thus, one indicator of good economic 
governance could be the level of respect that the institutions of international financial 
governance show for human rights in their member countries.  
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The third set of international legal principles applicable to international economic governance 
deals with the responsibility of states for the functioning of the global economic system. Based 
on general principles of state responsibility
10
, they have an obligation to provide foreign legal 
persons, which are present in the state, either through an investment or an individual transaction, 
with fair and non-discriminatory treatment.  This means that these foreign entities should receive 
comparable treatment to similarly situated domestic institutions.  
 
A fourth set of applicable international legal principles are derived from international 
environmental law
11
. At a minimum these principles would impose on regulators an obligation to 
insist that all financial institutions and other economic actors fully understand the environmental 
and social impacts of their practices and of individual transactions.  
 
D. Coordinated specialization 
 
The principle of coordinated specialization acknowledges that, even though development is 
holistic and all aspects of international governance are inter-connected, international economic 
governance cannot function efficiently without a limited and specialized mandate. Thus, the 
principle of coordinated specialization has two requirements. First, the mandate of the 
mechanisms and institutions of international economic governance must be clearly defined and 
limited to international economic affairs. Second, these institutions cannot ignore the other 
important aspects of the development process. Consequently, there is a need to ensure some form 
of coordination between the institutions and mechanisms of international economic governance 
and other organizations and arrangements for global governance. The coordinating mechanism, 
if it is to effectively resolve tensions between the different aspects of international governance, 
needs to be transparent and predictable. It may also need some dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
E. Good Administrative Practice 
 
The basic principles of good administrative practice in global governance are the same as those 
applicable to any public institution. These principles are transparency, predictability, 
participation, reasoned decision making, and accountability.  This means that all the institutions 
involved in international economic governance must conduct their operations in a manner that is 
sufficiently open that their procedures, decisions, and actions are predictable and understandable 
to all stakeholders. They must also offer these stakeholders some meaningful way of raising their 
concerns and having them addressed by the institutions. The institutions should also be required 
to explain their decisions and operations to all interested stakeholders. Finally, the stakeholders 
should be able to hold the institutions accountable for their decisions and actions.  
 
V. Tactical Issues 
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It is clear that there is neither general consensus on this long term vision nor on how to 
implement it. Moreover, it is clear that in the current phase of the transitions in global power, it 
is not possible to implement this vision. This suggests that during the current phase, middle 
powers should have adopt a pragmatic, approach to global economic governance reform. In brief 
they should concentrate on developing short term tactics that both result in real benefits for their 
countries and their citizens and that open up further opportunities for achieving global economic 
governance reforms that are consistent with their long term objectives.  
 
Implementing this strategy requires both setting priorities for the short term and developing a 
plan of action for achieving these objectives. For example, given that South Africa’s and Africa’s 
concerns in the global financial arena are focused on questions of poverty and  inequality, the 
sorts of issues that South Africa should prioritize in the G20 are those that can enhance the 
ability of Africa to address these issues. Given this general orientation, there are two issues in the 
financial area, that offer suitable short term objectives. The first relates to financial regulation.  
South Africa can call for broadening the scope of the banking regulatory reform agenda. In 
particular, South Africa can point out that for many African countries a key issue is the fact that 
many of their citizens and small companies do not have effective access to financial services. 
They can add that regulation can help address this issue by encouraging banks to develop new 
products that are specifically targeted at this problem. In this regard, it can also remind the rich 
countries of Paul Volcker’s contention that the most important financial innovation of recent 
years is the ATM because of its impact on enhancing convenience and access to financial 
services. Africa could also remind the world that the next innovation of this sort might be cell 
phone banking, in which Africa is a leader.  Another regulatory issue that should be addressed is 
the problem of how to get international banks to recycle at least a small proportion of the capital 
flight that they attract from African and other developing countries back into these countries.  A 
third regulatory issue is incentivising the banks to extend some of their more impressive social 
responsibility initiatives to other aspects of their business. A good example of such an initiative 
is the Equator Principles
12
, which deal with the management of the social and environmental 
risks in large project financings.  
.  
The second issue that South Africa and other that middle powers can prioritize is reform of the 
governance arrangements of the IMF.  It is becoming increasingly clear that, regardless of the 
rhetoric about the need for substantial reform of the IMF’s governance, substantial reform is 
unlikely to take place in the short term. Consequently, the most realistic reforms are those that 
are possible within the existing legal framework. One reform that can easily be achieved within 
this constraint is increasing the IMF’s public accountability. Unlike the World Bank and all the 
other multilateral development banks, it does not have an independent accountability 
mechanism. These mechanisms allow non-state actors, who claim that they have been harmed by 
the failure of these organizations to comply with their own policies and procedures, to have their 
claims investigated and reported to the Boards of these organizations. Their benefit to the 
organization is that they increase the efficacy of the operations of these entities by both 
enhancing compliance with their policies and procedures and by enabling the institution to gain 
more detailed empirical knowledge about the actual impact of their operations. This improves 
their ability to learn from their operations and to improve them. Another action that would 
improve global financial governance and is relatively easy to implement is increased 
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participation by developing countries in the appropriate decision making bodies of the 
international regulatory authorities like the BCBS, IOSCO and the IAIS. This increased 
participation should result in these bodies developing  principles and policies that are more 
sensitive to the needs of these countries and to impact of financial regulation on poverty and 
inequality.  
 
Finally, South Africa should combine this short term substantive vision with a plan of action that 
seeks allies from both other middle powers, like Australia, Brazil, Indonesia and the Korea, as 
well as other G20 members including, if appropriate, the G7 countries.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have argued that participation in the G20 offers middle powers like South Africa 
an opportunity to influence the global economic agenda and the institutional arrangements for 
global governance. However, given the current configuration of geo-political forces and the 
process of change they are undergoing this opportunity is limited both in terms of the scope of 
issues that can be addressed and in terms of the benefits that can be obtained on each issue. 
Moreover, in order to maximize the benefits that the middle powers can gain from this 
opportunity, they need to have a long term vision of the forms of international economic 
governance that they are seeking and to derive their short term objectives and implementation 
strategy from this vision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
